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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF MINOR FOR SALE OF
CHATrEL-MORTGAGED PROPERTY
The question of the liability of a minor for the crime of selling
chattel-mortgaged property (or property acquired under a conditional
sales contract) is as yet undecided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
The problem presents an example of a situation not often the subject
of criminal prosecution in the past which, due to changing conditions
and times, is assuming more and more importance today. The acquisi-
tion of personal property by minors in any degree which would raise
the problem of chattel mortgages thereon is of recent origin, its added
importance being due in the main to the increase in purchase and own-
ership by minors of one item of personalty-the automobile. The auto-
motive age has created or brought to the fore many legal problems of
which this should be no exception. If the reader will keep in mind the
relationship of automobiles to the problem, the practical importance of
it should not be lost in the ensuing discussion.
Though the situation, from the standpoint, at least, of its impor-
tance, is relatively new, the statute under which it arises is not. It first
appeared in Wisconsin in the Revised Statutes of 1858', and, as modi-
ued by subsequent legislative enactments, is today embodied in Section
343.69 of the Wisconsin Statutes, providing as follows:
"Any mortgagor of personal property or any vendee under a
conditional sales contract of personal property, who during the
existence of the lien or title created by such chattel mortgage or
conditional sales contract shall sell, transfer, conceal, remove or
carry or drive away said personal property or any part thereof,
without the written consent of the mortgagee or his assigns or
of the conditional sale vendor or his assigns, as the case may be,
and with intent to defraud, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the county jail not more than one year or in the state prison not
less than one nor more than five years or by fine not exceeding
$1000.''2 (emphasis added)
1 R.S. 1858, c. 45, s. 12.
Wis. Stats. (149) Sec. 343.69. Quoted above is the principal provision of the
section, but it is to be noted that two other grounds are provided upon which
a mortgagor of chattels may be convicted for their sale contrary to the pro-
visions of the statute: hindering or delaying mortgagee in repossession of
property (subsec. (b) ) and sale of property without disclosing mortgage to
purchaser (subsec. (c) ). The discussion is devoted only to the principal
provision on the ground that the same argument can be applied in the case
of minors to defeat a prosecution under one of these two supplementary
provisions. It would seem that to either charge the defense could be raised
that the acts made crimes by subsections (b) and (c) are acts which amount
to a disaffirmance of the contract, a right allowed the minor by the common
law, the exercise of which was not made a crime by the statute.
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It is fundamental in the law of contract that a minor may avoid his
contracts at any time during minority or within a reasonable time after
reaching majority.3 This rule is general and there are exceptions, but
for the present the concern will be with the general rule. The rule may
have a rather startling effect in the case of a minor giving a chattel
mortgage (on an automobile, for instance) with respect to his criminal
liability under the above statute should he sell or otherwise dispose of
the chattel so mortgaged in apparent violation of the statute. In order
to render a minor guilty of a crime under section 343.69 two requisites
are necessary, namely:
1. An enforceable lien or title created by the mortgage ;4 and
2. A disposition by the mortgagor of the mortgaged property in
one of the various ways enumerated in the statute without
the consent in writing of the mortgagee and with intent to
defraud him.
As has been noted, the contract of a minor is voidable at his option
either during his minority or within a reasonable time thereafter. It
therefore appears that the chattel mortgage of a minor creates no "en-
forceable lien or title," since it is voidable, and that, furthermore, a sale
by him of the chattel mortgaged property could never be "with intent
to defraud" the mortgagee, as the statute requires, since a sale by a
minor of such property is held to be a disaffirmance of his contract.5
343 C.J.S. Infants, §71 and §75; Grauman, Marx and Cline Co." v. Krienitz,
142 Wis. 556, 126 N.W. 50 (1910); Covault v. Nevitt, 157 Wis. 113, 146 N.W.
115 (1914); Peterson v. Weimar, 181 Wis. 231. 194 N.W. 346 (1923); Olson
v. Veum, 197 Wis. 342, 222 N.W. 233 (1928).
426 O.A.G. Wis. 105 (1937).5 Jones v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 252, 20 S.W. 578 (1892). Defendant, a minor
of 17, was convicted of disposing of mortgaged chattels by sale, contrary
to the statute. On appeal, held: Reversed and remanded. "To hold one re-
sponsible for fraudulently disposing of mortgaged property, there must be
a valid and subsisting mortgage enforceable at law. However solemnly
executed a conveyance or mortgage of personal property may be by a minor,
he may avoid it by sale or other act of disaffirmance. ... The law holds that
infants are lacking in judgment and understanding sufficient to enable them
to guard their own interests, and the law protects them against their own
improvidence and the designs of others by allowing them to avoid any act,
contract or conveyance not manifestly for their interest; and the general
rule seems t6 be no express contract, when repudiated or disaffirmed by a
minor, can be enforced against him . . . Now, courts refuse to enforce a
contract against a minor when disaffirmed by him, and it is well settled he
may repudiate any contract by refusal to pay or by sale and in other ways.
If the statute prohibiting the sale of mortgaged property is to be construed
as applying to him, when it strips him of the right to disaffirm the contract,
the shield of protection given him by the common law, and places him help-
lessly in the grasp of his creditor, who, under the threat of criminal prose-
cution, forbids the sale of his crop or the payment of its proceeds to him-
self. Such a contract can never be held for the benefit of a minor, and
courts, from the earliest times, have refused to 'uphold contracts with pen-
alties against minors." Accord: State v. Plaisted, 43 N.H. 413, (1861) ; State
v. Howard, 88 N.C. 651 (1883).
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"An infant's mortgage is not void but voidable. It is binding
until it is avoided. Any act of his clearly showing his intention
not to be bound by the mortgage is a sufficient avoidance of it.
An unconditional sale of the mortgaged property is such an act."8
The situation presented is one where a minor is incapable of the crim-
inal intent required by the statute to constitute the crime because of his
civil disability to contract. When a minor has once disaffirmed a con-
tract the same is void. A prosecution of a minor under section 343.69
then comes to this: ". . . that the State seeks ... to be hold the defend-
ant amenable to the criminal law for the violation of a void contract." 7
The essence of the argument is that the statute cannot be applied where
it would make a crime that which is the minor's common law right with-
out an express legislative declaration that the right has been abrogated.
As applied to a minor the statute attempts to make the exercise of his
right to disaffirm a crime.s
It is true that the statute does not expressly except minors from
prosecution. However, the statute does require the existence of an
enforceable lien or title and an intent on the part of the mortgagor to
defraud the mortgagee, impossible when the mortgagor is a minor. It
can be argued that the determining factor is not the absence of a pro-
vision in the statute excepting minors from prosecution, but rather the
failure of the legislature to expressly include minors within the pur-
view of it, since the minor has a right at common law to disaffirm and
void his chattel mortgage by selling the property. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina, in reversing the conviction of a minor under a
statute similar to ours, stated the proposition thus:
"The act, it is true, is very broad in its terms and contains no
saving clause, but it presents a case where there is a concurrence
of two laws-the one a statutory provision making the defend-
6Jones on Chattel Mortgages, sec. 40.
7 State v. Howard, supra, note 5. "An indictment . . . for disposing of crops
under mortgage cannot be sustained, where it appears that the defendant is
an infant. The alleged disposition is a disaffirmance of the contract and
renders it void."8 It is to be noted that the statute under which the minor is prosecuted must
attempt to make the disaffirmance a crime, despite the minor's common law
right to disaffirm, in order that minority may be a defense. Section 343.69 is
such a statute. But the disability to enter a binding contract is no defense
to a prosecution under a statute which makes it a crime to enter into a con-
tract, as, for example, a contract whereby defendant obtains property under
false pretenses. 11 years after deciding Jones v. State, supra, note 5, the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas was faced with such a situation in
Lively v. State, 74 S.W. 321 (1903). The defense relied upon Jones v. State,
but the conviction was affirmed and the court distinguished the two cases.
Disability to enter a binding contract does not give a minor a right to fraud-
ulently enter one, and consequently he may be prosecuted for such an
offense; but his disability does give him a right to disaffirm, and a statute
which attempts to make a crime of the exercise of that right may not be
used against him. Accord: Vinson v. State, 124 Ga. 19, 52 S.E. 79 (1905);
Babu v. Peterson, 4Cal. (2d) 276, 48 P. (2d) 689 (1935).
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ant indictable for a violation of his contract, the other a pro-
vision of the common law exempting the defendant by reason of
his infancy from the contract, because as to him it was void.
'Like two statutory laws,' says Bishop, 'they may stand well to-
gether up to a given point, and then they come in conflict. The
rule in this case is that the prior law is not repealed, but at such
point the one or the other simply gives -;¢ay. For example, a
statute general in its terms is always to be taken as subject to any
exceptions which the common law requires. Then, if it creates
an offense, it includes neither infants under the age of legal ca-
pacity nor insane persons,' &c. Bishop, Statutory Crimes."9
The rules that penal statutes and statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be strictly construed would seem to add weight to this argu-
ment. The question of inclusion of minors within the statute is then
essentially one of legislative intent, and, in the absence of an express
provision including them, or some other indication of a legislative in-
tention so to do, the common law right to disaffirm through sale must
take precedence over the broad terms of the statute. The result is that
minority becomes a valid defense to a prosecution under it, if the con-
tract is voidable.
It is manifest that the criminal prosecution must stand or fall ac-
cording as to whether or not the minor can avoid the contract. The dis-
ability to enter a binding contract is the factor which negatives any
possibility of a crime under section 343.69. Thus, in cases which are
exceptions to the general rule, cases in which the minor can be bound.
he is within the purview of the statute and can be prosecuted there-
under the same extent as an adult. Minority alone is not the defense;
minority coupled with the other circumstances which make the contract
voidable constitute it.
A minor may not avoid every contract which he makes. He is bound
by a contract for necessaries.'0 But to be necessaries the articles must
supply the infant's personal needs."' Neither emancipation nor the fact
that the minor engages in business removes incapacity to make general
contracts, and purchases made in trade are not necessaries. 12 And, most
important to the problem here discussed, the Wisconsin Court has held
that, in the case of an infant of small earning power living with his
narents near a city and having other means of transportation to and
from his work, an automobile is not a necessary.13 While the decision
does not exclude automobiles from classification as necessaries as a
9 State v. Howard, supra, note 5.10 Wis. Stats. (1949) Sec. 121.02(2), Uniform Sales Act; Grauman, Marx and
Cline Co. v. Krienitz, supra, note 3.
"1 Covault v. Nevitt, supra, note 3.
2 Wallace v. Newtale Furniture Co., 188 Wis. 205, 205 N.W. 819 (1925);
Schoenung v. Gallet, 206 Wis. 52, 238 N.W. 852 (1931).
i Schoenung v. Gallet, supra, note 12.
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matter of law, it would seem to foreclose any consideration of them as
such in the vast majority of cases.
The question also arises as to whether or not a minor may be
estopped to disaffirm and thus bound to his contract. The general rule
is that an infant cannot bind himself by estoppel.14 But where the in-
fant in fact has the discretion of an adult and makes an express fraud-
ulent misrepresentation of his capacity to contract thus inducing the
other party to the contract to enter it, he is estopped to later plead
minority to avoid the contract, but only if the contract is beneficial to
him.15 Mere failure to disclose age, when not asked and when no artifice
is employed to mislead, is insufficient to work an estoppel. 6 From the
nature of the conditions attached, it readily appears that a minor can-
not often be bound by estoppel. Not the least of these conditions is the
one prescribing that the contract must be beneficial to the minor. The
North Carolina Court has gone so far as to say that a chattel mortgage
can never be beneficial to a minor as a matter of law.17 This view would
seem somewhat extreme, for it is not inconceivable that, in a particular
case, a chattel mortgage might be a benefit to a minor. However, in the
ordinary case, such as the purchase of an automobile, the courts would
probably be very reluctant to hold a chattel mortgage a benefit because
of their opposition to a minor's coming of age saddled with debt and
with what property he does have in jeopardy. But numerous instances
present themselves for speculation as to how a court might hold on the
question of beneficiality. In the case of a minor giving a chattel mort-
gage to secure the purchase price of necessaries the mortgage could be
a benefit, though the problem is purely academic since the minor is
bound on his contract for necessaries of which the mortgage is an in-
cident. However, were the minor to give a mortgage on personalty
already owned by him in order to raise ready cash with which to buy
necessaries in a separate transaction from a third party, an interesting
and practical problem is presented on the question of binding the minor
to his mortgage on the theory of benefit when the other requisites of
estoppel are present.
Having considered the problem arising from a prosecution under
section 343.69, it becomes apparent that the remedy of a chattel mort-
gage against an infant mortgager for the sale without his permission
of the mortgaged chattels is not a criminal action in the vast majority
of cases, for it is the exception to the rule when a minor is bound to
his contract, and the case must come within the exception if the prose-
cution is to succeed. The only "remedy," if it can be termed such, is an
14 Grauman, Marx and Cline Co. v. Krienitz, supra, note 3.
15 Supra, note 14.
'
1 Supra, note 14.
17 State v. Howard, supra, note 5.
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extraordinary amount of diligence and care on the part of prospective
mortgagees. The amount of care required is illustrated by the fact that
not even an express misrepresentation of age by a minor will avail to
bind him if the mortgage is not beneficial to him. The common law
declares that the risk shall be upon the adult party to the contract, and
it prohibits the criminal prosecution of the minor party as the price to
be paid for the exercise of the right to disaffirm, which it, in its wisdom,
has granted.
ROBERT F. BODEN
